Let us take an example that Bernard Williams (1981: 102) made famous. Suppose that you want a gin and tonic, and you believe that the stuff in front of you is gin. In fact, however, the stuff is not gin but petrol. So if you drink the stuff (even mixed with tonic), it will be decidedly unpleasant, to say the least. Should you choose to drink the stuff or not?

Here is a definition of knowledge: for you to know a proposition p is for you to have an outright belief in p that is correct precisely because it manifests the virtue of rationality. This definition resembles Ernest Sosa’s “virtue theory”, except that on this definition, the only virtue that must be manifested in all instances of knowledge is rationality, and no reductive account of rationality is attempted—rationality is assumed to be an irreducibly normative notion. This definition is compatible with (...) “internalism” about rationality, and with a form of “pragmatic encroachment” on the conditions of rational outright belief. An interpretation is given of this definition, and especially of the sense of ’because’ that it involves. On this interpretation, this definition entails that both safety and adherence are necessary conditions on knowledge; it supports a kind of contextualism about terms like ‘knowledge’; and it provides resources to defend safety, adherence, and contextualism, against some recent objections. (shrink)

In this paper, I apply the "conceptual role semantics" approach that I have proposed elsewhere (according to which the meaning of normative terms is given by their role in practical reasoning or deliberation) to the meaning of the term 'ought'. I argue that this approach can do three things: It can give an adequate explanation of the special connection that normative judgments have to practical reasoning and motivation for action. It can give an adequate account of why the central principles (...) of deontic logic are correct. It can give an explanation of the precise ways in which the term 'ought' is systematically context-sensitive, so that the term expresses different (but systematically related) concepts in different contexts. (shrink)

Often, when one faces a choice between alternative actions, there are reasons both for and against each alternative. On one way of understanding these words, what one “ought to do all things considered (ATC)” is determined by the totality of these reasons. So, these reasons can somehow be “combined” or “aggregated” to yield an ATC verdict on these alternatives. First, various assumptions about this sort of aggregation of reasons are articulated. Then it is shown that these assumptions allow for the (...) proof of a “Reasons Aggregation Theorem” – parallel to John Harsanyi’s 1955 “Social Aggregation Theorem”. All reasons for action are grounded in reason-providing values; and, for every such reason-providing value, there is in principle a way of measuring how strongly this value counts against each alternative. The theorem tells us that the appropriate measure of how much reason ATC there is against each alternative is simply a weighted sum of the strengths with which these values count against that alternative; the agent ought not ATC to perform an action iff there is ATC more reason against it than against some available alternative. (shrink)

Intuitively, it seems that some belief-forming practices have the following three properties: 1. They are rational practices, and the beliefs that we form by means of these practices are themselves rational or justified beliefs. 2. Even if in most cases these practices reliably lead to correct beliefs (i.e., beliefs in true propositions), they are not infallible: it is possible for beliefs that are formed by means of these practices to be incorrect (i.e., to be beliefs in false propositions). 3. The (...) rationality of these practices is basic or primitive. That is, the rationality of these practices is not due simply to the availability, by means of some process of reasoning that relies purely on other practices, of a rational or justified belief in the reliability of these practices. -/- How can there be such practices? This paper offers an answer to that question. (shrink)

This essay offers an account of the truth conditions of sentences involving deontic modals like ‘ought’, designed to capture the difference between objective and subjective kinds of ‘ought’ This account resembles the classical semantics for deontic logic: according to this account, these truths conditions involve a function from the world of evaluation to a domain of worlds (equivalent to a so-called “modal base”), and an ordering of the worlds in such domains; this ordering of the worlds itself arises from two (...) further elements – a probability function and a value function – since this ordering ranks the worlds in accordance with the expected value of certain propositions that are true at those worlds. Thus, a proposition of the form ‘Ought (p)’ is true at a world of evaluation w if and only if p is true at all the top-ranked worlds in the domain assigned to w. This domain of worlds consists of metaphysically possible worlds, while the probability function is defined over a space of epistemically possible worlds (which may include metaphysically impossible worlds, such as worlds where Hesperus is not Phosphorus). Evidence is given that this account assigns the correct truth conditions to a wide range of sentences involving ‘ought’. Since these truth conditions involve both a domain of metaphysically possible worlds and a space of epistemically possible worlds, there are two corresponding kinds of conditional involving ‘ought’, depending on which space of worlds is restricted by the conditional. Finally, some objections that might be raised against this account are answered. (shrink)

Richard Price’s moral epistemology provides a distinctive account, not only of the sources of our moral knowledge, but also of its limits – that is, of the moral truths that we do not and even cannot know. According to this moral epistemology, the fundamental moral truths are necessary rather than contingent; if they are knowable at all, they are knowable a priori. In general, fundamental moral truths are akin to mathematical truths. Specifically, these necessary moral truths are grounded in the (...) essences of act-types, which are knowable through ‘intuition’ if knowable at all. However, Price firmly rejects utilitarianism, recognizing several different ‘branches of virtue’, which can conflict with each other. As he argues, we cannot know the truth about act-types that exemplify such conflicting branches of virtue if the competing considerations are too finely balanced. This view of moral epistemology is compared with those of several other philosophers, including W. D. Ross. It is argued that Price has a more unified view than Ross: for Price, all moral knowledge flows from a priori intuition, but this is compatible with our being ignorant of many of the fine details of the fundamental truths of morality. (shrink)

Let ‘semantic relevance’ be the thesis that the wide semantic properties of representational mental states (like beliefs and desires) are causally relevant to behavior. A popular way of arguing for semantic relevance runs as follows: start with a sufficient counterfactual condition for causal or explanatory relevance, and show that wide semantic properties meet it with respect to behavior (e.g., Loewer & Lepore (1987,1989), Rescorla (2014), Yablo (2003)).This paper discusses an in‐principle limitation of this strategy: even the most sophisticated counterfactual criteria (...) systematically misclassify irrelevant properties as relevant when they stand in certain kinds of modal co‐variation or ‘entanglement’ relations to genuinely relevant properties. This entanglement problem, I argue, is more general and more serious than proponents of the counterfactual strategy have recognized: it threatens recent interventionist arguments for semantic relevance, and is not easily solved by appeal to proportionality or naturalness. I end by suggesting that proponents of semantic relevance may need to shift their attention from patterns of counterfactuals to the lawful psychological generalizations that explain them. (shrink)

Hierocles, a Stoic of the second century CE, famously deployed an image of the ‘concentric circles’ that surround each of us. The image should not be read as advocating absolute impartiality (in the style of classical utilitarianism) or as illustrating the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis. Instead, it is designed to illustrate how it is ‘appropriate to act’ in certain cases. Like other Stoics, Hierocles bases his investigation of appropriate acts on what is ‘in accordance with nature’. According to his view, (...) each of us has a duty of mutual aid towards every other human being—but a weightier duty towards those who are socially closer than those who are more distant. The fundamental principle is that each of us has the duty of being an ‘ally’ of every other human being in serving the natural purposes of all the circles to which we and that other human being both belong. (shrink)

This chapter is concerned with the distinction that most contemporary epistemologists express by distinguishing between “propositional” and “doxastic” justification. The goal is to develop an account of this distinction that applies, not just to full or outright beliefs, but also to partial credences—and indeed, in principle, to attitudes of all kinds. The standard way of explaining this distinction, in terms of the “basing relation”, is criticized, and an alternative account—the “virtue manifestation” account—is proposed in its place. This account has a (...) certain kinship with the epistemological approach that is known as “reliabilism”, but it also has certain key differences—above all, it is compatible with an internalist view of rationality. (shrink)

This is a review of Christopher Peacocke's book The Realm of Reason (Oxford University Press, 2004).

At the outset of an ethnographic inquiry, we navigated national and international resources to search for theoretical and practical guidance on obtaining parents and children’s informed consent/assent. While much theoretical guidance debating ethical issues to children’s participation in research was found, a paucity of published papers offering practical guidance on assent processes and/or visual representations of child assent forms and information sheets was discovered. The purpose of this article is to describe our experiences, both theoretically and practically, of negotiating the (...) process of obtaining informed consent and assent with parents and children for a non-therapeutic qualitative research study. We hope this article instigates a platform for others to explicate their experience and contributes to the construction of a coherent body of knowledge which will clearly delineate important elements that must be considered when negotiating children’s agreement to participate in research. (shrink)

This article explores the patient consent process in modern community pharmacy practice and discusses the related ethical dilemmas in this environment. The myth of appropriately informed consent, and irrefutable evidence as to a pharmacist’s intentions when advising a patient, are core issues for discussion. The objective is to clarify where such dilemmas may exist in the consent process and to ultimately form a framework against which ethical guidelines might facilitate resolution of the dilemma faced by the pharmacist who is expected (...) to simultaneously maintain legal and duty of care responsibilities in the patient consent process. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the scientific, legal, and ethical foundations for inclusion of transgender women athletes in competitive sport, drawing on IOC principles and relevant Court of Arbitration for Sport decisions. We argue that the inclusion of trans athletes in competition commensurate with their legal gender is the most consistent position with these principles of fair and equitable sport. Biological restrictions, such as endogenous testosterone limits, are not consistent with IOC and CAS principles. We explore the implications for recognizing (...) that endogenous testosterone values are a ‘natural physical trait’ and that excluding legally recognized women for high endogenous testosterone values constitutes discrimination on the basis of a natural physical trait. We suggest that the justificatory burden for such prima facie discrimination is unlikely to be met. Thus, in place of a limit on endogenous testosterone for women, we argue that ‘legally recognized gender’ is most fully in line with IOC and CAS principles. (shrink)

Un invito a vedere nella vita e nelle opere di don Sturzo delle risposte alle difficoltà del mondo attuale, approfondendo le ragioni di un impegno cristiano per il recupero della dimensione etica dell’economia, della politica e delle istituzioni.

many symbols. We define o, as the probability that an arbitrary machine be circular and we prove that o, is a random number that goes beyond..

It is commonly thought that that the best system account of lawhood ((Mill (1843), Ramsey (1978)[fp. 1928], Lewis (1973)) makes available a nice explanation for why laws are ‘distinctively appropriate targets of scientific inquiry’ (Hall, 2015). The explanation takes the following general form: laws are especially valuable for agents like us because they efficiently encode a lot of valuable (non-nomic) information in a tractable format. The goal of this paper is to challenge this style of explanation: I argue that the (...) general principle it presupposes is in conflict with our best account of practical rationality. After considering and rejecting a number of proposals for dissolving the tension, I conclude that BSA proponents may need to scale back the explanatory ambitions of their theory; in particular, they may need to give up the hope of non-circular explanations of the value of nomic information. I end by outlining some challenges for the humean world-view that results after this shift. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Chapter 1 -- The Prison of the Known -- Chapter 2 -- Can We Live without Conflict? -- Chapter 3 -- The Meaning of Dialogue -- Chapter 4 -- Practice and Solidarity: We Are the World -- Chapter 5 -- Science and the Religious Mind -- Chapter 6 -- A Call for Active Being: Being at Home in the World.

We live in dangerous times, ruled by the imperatives of what Hannah Arendt calls “the catastrophic interiority of the selfish I” 1 which threatens the planet and the survival of humanity. But I believe, nevertheless, that it is possible to reinvent the world since, by and large, it is evident that its shape reflects our notions of reality and value, the way we weave together the various strands of existence. Antonio Gramsci may have had something like this in mind when (...) he wrote that it is only by “the conquest of greater consciousness” that we will be able to bring a different kind of culture into being because, “man is above all spirit,” a creature, that is, with imagina- tion, the ability to reconfigure the way we see ourselves and the world. Just as importantly, he argues that this may mean returning to some things we once knew but have now forgotten or ignored. Poetry or, to be more accurate, poetic ways of seeing, may be one of these things, to the extent that it generates ways of seeing beyond the merely rational. In this essay I therefore want to explore the work of Judith Wright and the ways in which it explores the possibilities of being ‘true to the earth’. 2. (shrink)

This paper deals with epistemological and methodological complexities in gender studies, when applied to the social movements of indigenous and peasant women in rural Mexico. Their problems, actions, achievements, projects and utopia, allow the appropriation and redefinition of concepts from local ..

This is a book about normativity -- where the central normative terms are words like 'ought' and 'should' and their equivalents in other languages. It has three parts: The first part is about the semantics of normative discourse: what it means to talk about what ought to be the case. The second part is about the metaphysics of normative properties and relations: what is the nature of those properties and relations whose pattern of instantiation makes propositions about what ought to (...) be the case true. The third part is about the epistemology of normative beliefs: how we could ever know, or even have rational or justified belief in, propositions about what ought to be the case. (shrink)

It’s relatively easy to say that the debates about whether trans and intersex women athletes deserve full and equal inclusion in women’s sport is a contentious contemporary issue. I’ve already argued for the legal, ethical, and scientific basis for full and equal inclusion of trans and intersex women in women’s sport. In this paper, I want to analyze what I take to be a representative selection of recent arguments against full and equal inclusion of trans and intersex women in women’s (...) sport. In short, these arguments tend to be based on mere assumption, unsupported “common sense,” straw arguments, fallacious question begging, and a number of hypotheticals and unsupported counterfactuals rather than established fact. Essentially, they’re based on a lot of “ifs.”. (shrink)

Background:Ethical competence in nursing practice helps clinical nurses to think critically, analyse issues, make ethical decisions, solve ethical problems and behave ethically in their daily work. Thus, ethical competence contributes to the promotion of high-quality care. However, studies on ethical competence in Malawi are scanty.Objectives:The aim of this study was to explore ethical competence among clinical nurses in selected hospitals in Malawi.Methodology:A cross-sectional survey was conducted in four selected hospitals in Malawi with a sample of 271 clinical nurses. Data were (...) collected using self-administered questionnaires, which included a Moral Competence Scale for Home Care Nurses. Descriptive statistics and logistic regression were computed for the dataset using STATA version 12.0.Ethical consideration:The study protocol complied with all ethical requirements and was approved by the College of Medicine Research Ethics Committee under the University of Malawi.Results:The clinical nurses in Malawi are ethically competent. However, there is a significantly high number (p 0.05). Three determinants of high ethical competence level (strong will, judgement skills and recognition of discrepancy of intention) were identified through a reduced model after stepwise logistic regression analysis. Furthermore, results show that indicators of ethical competence include caring, confidentiality and observance of nurses dressing code. The study has also confirmed that the Moral Competence Scale for Home Care Nurses is a reliable tool to assess ethical competence in low-resource settings.Conclusion:The majority of nurses who completed the survey had low ethical competence. However, clinical nurses with high ethical competence level are required to competently manage complex ethical challenges in health facilities. Strategies for enhancing ethical competence such as continuing ethics education, establishment of ethics committees and provision of supportive supervision are recommended to enable nurses in Malawi attain a high level of ethical competence. (shrink)

Abstract:Brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) can enable communication for persons in severe paralysis including locked-in syndrome (LIS); that is, being unable to move or speak while aware. In cases of complete loss of muscle control, termed “complete locked-in syndrome,” a BCI may be the only viable solution to restore communication. However, a widespread ignorance regarding quality of life in LIS, current BCIs, and their potential as an assistive technology for persons in LIS, needlessly causes a harmful situation for this cohort. In addition (...) to their medical condition, these persons also face social barriers often perceived as more impairing than their physical condition. Through social exclusion, stigmatization, and frequently being underestimated in their abilities, these persons are being locked out in addition to being locked-in. In this article, we (1) show how persons in LIS are being locked out, including how key issues addressed in the existing literature on ethics, LIS, and BCIs for communication, such as autonomy, quality of life, and advance directives, may reinforce these confinements; (2) show how these practices violate the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and suggest that we have a moral responsibility to prevent and stop this exclusion; and (3) discuss the role of BCIs for communication as one means to this end and suggest that a novel approach to BCI research is necessary to acknowledge the moral responsibility toward the end users and avoid violating the human rights of persons in LIS. (shrink)

Ralph Wedgwood gives a general account of what it is for states of mind and processes of thought to count as rational. Whether you are thinking rationally depends purely on what is going on in your mind, but rational thinking is a means to the goal of getting things right in your thinking, by believing the truth or making good choices.

The introduction of new medical treatments based on invasive technologies has often been surrounded by both hopes and fears. Hope, since a new intervention can create new opportunities either in terms of providing a cure for the disease or impairment at hand; or as alleviation of symptoms. Fear, since an invasive treatment involving implanting a medical device can result in unknown complications such as hardware failure and undesirable medical consequences. However, hopes and fears may also arise due to the cultural (...) embeddedness of technology, where a therapy due to ethical, social, political and religious concerns could be perceived as either a blessing or a threat. While Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) for treatment resistant depression (TRD) is still in its cradle, it is important to be proactive and try to scrutinize both surfacing hopes and fears. Patients will not benefit if a promising treatment is banned or avoided due to unfounded fears, nor will they benefit if DBS is used without scrutinizing the arguments which call for caution. Hence blind optimism is equally troublesome. We suggest that specificity, both in terms of a detailed account of relevant scientific concerns as well as ethical considerations, could be a way to analyse expressed concerns regarding DBS for TRD. This approach is particularly fruitful when applied to hopes and fears evoked by DBS for TRD, since it can reveal if our comprehension of DBS for TRD suffer from various biases which may remain unnoticed at first glance. We suggest that such biases exist, albeit a further analysis is needed to explore this issue in full. (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique : "Du Mutterrecht, l'oeuvre majeure de Bachofen, Walter Benjamin écrivait qu'il s'agissait d'une « prophétie scientifique ». De prime abord, il s'agit là d'une étrange définition pour un ouvrage qui, loin de se tourner vers l'avenir et d'en délinéer les formes, explore les confins du passé pour esquisser, par le biais de l'étude des mythes, le contour de l'origine de nos sociétés. La pensée de Bachofen est prophétique car révolutionnaire, et par là même porteuse de (...) fruits pour l'avenir. Il a en effet avancé une thèse bouleversante : les premières sociétés humaines auraient été régies par un droit maternel, l'organisation patriarcale n'étant qu'une forme plus avancée, certes, mais plus tardive de l'évolution spirituelle et sociale de l'humanité. Sa pensée permet ainsi de réfléchir à la prégnance de l'opposition masculin/féminin, maternel/paternel dans les fondements mêmes de nos sociétés, mais aussi de considérer l'importance que la notion d'origine, et la représentation, pour erronée qu'elle soit, qui en est faite, revêt pour la construction et le maintien de la société et de ses structures. C'est bien là une réflexion avec laquelle, aux dires de Bachofen lui-même, « on n'est pas prêt d'en finir ».". (shrink)

Dans la pensée de Walter Benjamin, le mythe est-il seulement une source de danger et de séduction contre laquelle l'homme moderne devrait se protéger à tout prix? Par une approche qui convoque la philosophie, l'anthropologie et la sociologie, ce livre montre que la réponse à cette question est loin d'être tranchée. Le diagnostic que, au fil de ses oeuvres, Benjamin dresse sur l'appauvrissement de l'expérience moderne est de fait indissociable du problème posé par le mythe, en tant que porteur d'un (...) savoir que la modernité ne sait plus reconnaître et encore moins accepter. La confrontation avec Scholem et Kafka indique que, pour Benjamin, ce savoir relève du langage et participe de ce récit grâce auquel l'individu peut penser son existence au sein d'une histoire commune, d'une tradition avec laquelle la modernité semble toutefois vouloir en finir. (shrink)

The article discusses a relatively obscure but significant aspect of work of the Russian and Soviet thinker Alexander Bogdanov—his science fiction novels. The author points out that, using the form...

O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma argumentação sobre a possibilidade de se pensar a justiça como uma experiência do i m possível. Parte-se da distinção derridiana entre justiça e direito. Essa distinção trará algumas implicações no que tradicionalmente é entendido como ética. Partindo do jogo ou da différance marcada entre a presença/ausência, pretende-se estabelecer um ponto de diálogo entre Derrida e Levinas. O ponto de aproximação é a questão do terceiro na relação do face a face. Nesse sentido, problematiza-se (...) se a desconstrução pode ser adotada como um possível modo filosófico que fundamente a compreensão da justiça. (shrink)